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Legal ethics for a fragmented society: 
between professional and personal 
 
ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON* 
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Ontario, Canada 
 
 
 
 
 
The lawyer is always in a hurry. He has become keen and shrewd; ... 
but his soul is small and righteous. 
Plato 
 
The legal profession has never been much loved. From Plato through Charles 
Dickens to Tom Wolfe, literature attests eloquently to its impugned status. As 
much envied as reviled, the reputation and prestige of lawyers is now 
considered by many to be at an all-time low. Its image as a noble and 
honourable profession is in tatters. Society tends to view lawyers as a rich and 
elite profession that is more interested in its own pocketbook than the public 
interest. The number of savage jokes about lawyers would be funny if they 
did not touch a raw nerve: after all, humour is not so much an escape from 
reality as from despair. In receipt of a professional monopoly, lawyers are 
considered self-interested and undeserving of their privileged right to govern 
themselves. Indeed, the legal profession is seen to epitomise George Bernard 
Shaw's quip that "every profession is a conspiracy against the laity". However, 
while a similar sense of dissatisfaction and anxiety is evident inside the less 
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 crass sectors of the profession, the more familiar refrain is that any crisis is 
attributable to the fact that the profession once had a shared sense of legal 
ethics and professional responsibility which has been lost. Having become 
too much a corporate business than a public vocation, it is urged that the legal 
profession must revert to this traditional esprit de corps if it is to regain its 
respectability and stature: lawyers must reclaim the ethical legacy of noble 
lawyers past. 
Like most expressions of nostalgia, this characterisation of the perceived 
crisis and its proffered solution has some grounding in reality. But it is as 
much a pious pretence as a genuine remedy for institutional ills. The profession 
has indeed become more business-like in operation and, as a result, more 
corporate in attitude; legal services are treated as one more commodity to be 
bought and sold in the marketplace. This tendency has been facilitated by the 
traditional view of legal ethics which puts service-the belief that lawyers do 
not have responsibility for the law and its development, but only for the 
satisfaction of their clients' wishes-before justice. 1 Moreover, it is most 
definitely not the case that the cure for the perceived professional blight is 
a return to the values and standards of yesteryear. On the contrary, what is 
required is the development of a fresh approach to legal ethics that is both 
sensitive to the changing shape and style of modem legal practice and, at the 
same time, demands that lawyers aspire to a more diverse and critical self-
image. Accordingly, mindful that the homogeneity of lawyers is beginning to 
be replaced by more diverse personnel, the theme of this article will be to 
assess the implications that the challenge of a fragmented society and legal 
profession holds for the critical development of a transformed practice of 
professional responsibility. 
After sketching the different demands and design of a fragmented society, 
I will concentrate on how the legal profession itself is beginning to fragment 
and what that means for existing accounts of legal ethics. In particular, my 
focus will be on how it is vital to rethink present understandings of 
lawyers' ethical personae and to canvass future possibilities for a more 
compelling vision of a professional modus vivendi. Emphasising the 
Canadian predicament, I will argue that a fragmented society deserves a 
fragmented legal profession which, in tum, warrants a more fragmented 
idea and implementation of legal ethics. There must be a shift of 
emphasis from professional regulation to personal responsibility. As well as 
indicating the shape and direction that such a revised ethical stance might 
take, I explore the more substantive and concrete consequences for legal 
education and professional practice. My ambition is not to promote a particular 
set of ethical outcomes or inculcate a specific mode of professional 
responsibility; it is to challenge students and lawyers to develop a professional 
modus vivendi of their own that constructs as it constantly challenges and 
re-works an appropriate professional attitude and practice. In the same 
way that there is no one or unchanging way to be a good person, there is 
no one or unchanging way to be a good lawyer: each and every lawyer 
must be capable of developing a style and substance of lawyering that 
incorporates a continuing dialogue-with oneself, clients, other lawyers, other 
professionals, and the community at large-about what counts as good 
lawyering. The central question is whether it is ever acceptable that lawyers 
might, can or should act in a professional capacity in such a way that it would 
be contrary to their own moral values.2 
 
 Traditional ethics 
The traditional image of the ethical lawyer has remained largely static and 
unchanged for many decades. It is centred on the idea that lawyers are 
super-technocrats; they possess an expert set of talents and techniques which 
they deploy for the advantage of those people who hire them. Regarding 
themselves as being neutral on the substance and form of the law, their task 
is very much to apply the law, perhaps to criticise it a little, but most 
certainly not to make it. Lawyers' commitment is to the legal system which, 
even when they are working around and within it, must be accepted as given. 
Almost indifferent to who their clients are, lawyers think of themselves as 
more chosen than choosing. The relationship between lawyer and client is built 
upon trust and respect: clients are to trust lawyers to act in the clients' best 
interests and, in.return, lawyers will respect the clients' autonomy. It is not for 
lawyers to impinge upon the clients' autonomy, but to act on behalf of the 
clients to realise their interests and inspirations. The lawyer is expected to 
treat all clients exactly the same in the sense that they are each citizens who 
have had their rights infringed and want relief or vindication. Advocacy and 
action tends, therefore, to be standardised and routinised. Insofar as lawyer 
and clients are from different cultures and classes, lawyers are expected to 
bridge the gap by personal empathy and professional solidarity. 
Although the validity and merit of this ethical self-image is almost 
taken for granted by most lawyers and jurists, it is based on certain 
foundational premises about law, society and ways of thinking about them. 
Like all operating assumptions, they are more controversial than many 
traditionalists care to think or acknowledge. Some of the more important ones 
are that: 
• Law is objective and certain-the hallmark of good lawyers is considered 
to be found in their cultivation of rule-craft in which the ability to identify 
the extant rules of the legal system and apply them to particular situations is 
paramount. As such, law has considerable stability and independence, offers 
operationally determinate guidance to the trained lawyer, and is 
institutionally distinct from the more open-minded disputations around 
ideological politics. 
• All clients are to be treated the same-all clients have pre-established 
interests and come to lawyers to have their rights vindicated. The task of 
lawyers is to accept any clients that seek their services and to utilise their 
common expertise in pursuing the interests of their clients in such a way 
that justice will be done and the Rule of Law upheld. 
• The criminal trial is the paradigm of legal responsibility-the basic dynamic 
of the legal system is traceable to the adversarial contest between 
individual and state in the criminal process. While the roles of lawyers vary 
in civil trials and non-adversarial contexts, their basic responsibilities can 
be extrapolated from the institutional setting of the criminal brief. 
• Lawyering is an apolitical undertaking-lawyers pursue their clients' interests 
through the extant rules, procedures and venues of law: overt politicisation 
is severely frowned upon. While lawyers engage in struggles that arise in 
and have consequences for politics, lawyering is a neutral exercise that 
does not implicate lawyers in any political process and that insists upon no 
commitment to any particular ideology. 
As attractive and as comforting as this traditional image of legal ethics and 
 professional responsibility may be to legal practitioners, its problems are 
manifest and manifold. It fails theoretically, empirically and ideologically-it is 
based upon a formalistic theory of law that is largely discredited and defunct 
as a serious attempt to understand law and its operation. It describes a version 
of legal practice that no longer has any empirical validity or historical 
accuracy, if it ever did have; and it defends both its informing theory and 
governing practice of lawyering as apolitical in such a way that merely serves 
to underline its very definite ideological commitments.3 However, for present 
purposes of highlighting the traditional model of the ethical lawyer, there are 
two underlying premises which are most pertinent--one is the notion of a 
reasonably homogenous and uniform legal profession and the other is the idea 
of a role-differentiated and rule-based morality. 
First, the traditional image of the ethical lawyer asks lawyers to 
subordinate their personal morality and identity to the standardised 
requirements of a role-defined rule-based morality. It assumes that legal 
professionals will appreciate and actualise the demands of a role-
differentiated morality in which lawyers' duties are exclusively bounded by 
the law and the professional code of conduct on one side and the clients' 
interests on the other. It is a two-dimensional moral universe in which 
lawyers are no more expected to intrude their own personal values than actors 
or butlers in the performance of their duties.4 Such a notion allows persons to 
claim moral legitimacy for actions that might be considered illegitimate in 
other, different roles and contexts. Moreover, once in this professional role, 
lawyers are required to treat morality in the same way that they deal with 
law-as an exhaustive body of rules that can be formally applied to resolve the 
most recalcitrant of difficulties and dilemmas. Consequently, in the 
traditional approach, there is very little space for reflection or engagement; 
reference to the professional codes is intended to provide definitive and 
authoritative answers. 
Secondly, the traditional image and professional codes are (not so 
subtly) underpinned with the view of the white, male lawyer as an independent 
professional who deals with a range of legal tasks and who is driven as much 
by civic pride as commercial ambition; lawyers are a homogeneous group 
who engage in broadly similar work. This notion of the fungible lawyer who 
inhabits, with only slight variation and adaptation, all the offices and activities 
throughout society is a myth. The reality is that, while such anachronisms 
exist, they are the exception rather than the rule. Indeed, there is no longer one 
image of the lawyer; they are an increasingly heterogenous and stratified bunch 
whose backgrounds, ambitions and standards are much less uniform than was 
previously the case. However, the legal profession is becoming more 
diversified, it remains a very stratified profession in which the white male 
lawyers still exercise the most control over the regulation and self-image of 
the profession. It is to the critique of these two premises-the existence of a 
homogenous legal profession and the worth of a role-differentiated and rule-
based morality-that I now turn. 
 
Fragmented profession 
Whether there ever has been one type of lawyer or one kind of legal practice, 
Canada's legal profession at the end of the twentieth century comprises many 
types of lawyers and many kinds of legal practice. Although the Canadian 
literature is not as extensive or as thorough as that of the United Kingdom 
 and the United States,5 there is ample evidence to support the developing view 
that talk of one legal profession is almost becoming fanciful; there is such a 
horizontally and vertically differentiated set of people and organisations 
engaging in different sorts of legal practice that generalisations are as 
unfounded as they are misleading. The profession is differentiated into mega-
firms, smaller partnerships, and single practitioners, not to mention 
government lawyers and the like; there is little shared experience, little 
interaction between them and each operate in line within different cultures and 
norms. Indeed, the idea that there is a unified legal profession is not only 
mythical, but has an insidious bearing on legal ethics. From its elite status at 
Confederation, the legal profession has become increasingly fragmented, both 
in terms of diversity (different people and forms of organisation) and 
stratification (a hierarchical order to such diversity). Unfortunately, there has 
been a marked tendency for the benefits of diversity to be neutralised by the 
imposition of stratification: the new and diverse personnel are relegated to the 
marginalised periphery of the legal profession. While the profession has 
diversified, the typical lawyer remains male, white, Englishspeaking, early 
middle-aged, and Christian: other lawyers who deviate from this norm are 
greater in number, but still less powerful in prestige and influence.6 
Legal practice is shaped by many factors, both external and internal to 
it. In recent decades, the Canadian legal profession has been strongly 
influenced by a variety of environmental forces over which it has very little 
control: decreasing state regulation; the juridification of dispute-resolution; the 
re-structuring of the economy; the extent of globalisation; and the spread of 
computerisation and information technology. Not surprisingly, these external 
forces have been mediated through a set of internal filters that affect their 
impact on the workings of the legal profession. 7 The first thing to note is 
that there is no longer a Canadian legal profession-there are many different 
ones, ranging from the solo practice to the large corporate bureaucracy through 
the small partnerships and government lawyers. The days of the fungible 
lawyer or legal practice are long gone. There is a wide range of lawyering types 
who engage in a wide variety of practices. Who does law (men and women, 
young and old, black and white, etc.), where they do it (office towers, 
shopping malls, clinics, home basements, government offices, mobile vans, 
etc.), how they do it (with entrepreneurial flair, part-time, on a shoe-string, as 
big business, etc.), who they do it for (aboriginal people, rich individuals, 
international conglomerates, homeless, small businesses, etc.), and what they 
do it for (subsistence income, personal satisfaction, enormous income, 
political influence, etc.) has gone through a transformation. However, as well 
as there being a greater diversification of the legal profession, there has been a 
marked increase in the stratification. Lawyers are distinguished not only by 
what they do, but the professional satisfaction, financial reward, public 
esteem and political influence that they experience. 
The size of the Canadian legal profession increased by 430% from 1931 to 
1986 and went from 2,710 members in 1986 to 49,680 in 1996. This 
translated in Ontario into the lawyer/population ratio jumping from 1/1142 in 
1960 to 1/574 in 1981. As Figures 1 and 2 show, the proportion of different 
ethnicities, genders, nationalities and religious affiliations has changed 
significantly: while the percentage of lawyers born in Canada has reduced 
slightly, the general diversity has improved significantly. As regards the 
organisation and hierarchy of legal practice, Figures 3 and 4 reflect the 
increasing variety of ways in which lawyers practice law. However, 
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census.) Source: Statistics Canada, Census of Canada, 1971 and 1981, special 
tabulations. 
 
there are certain forms of legal practice that are much more prestigious than 
others and certain differences have some definite implications for legal ethics. 
In particular, not only do the elite firms have greater access to the law society 
bodies that develop the rules and culture of the profession, but the sole 
practitioner is much more likely to be subject to formal monitoring by the 
profession. In short, big-time lawyers establish the standards of good lawyering 
and ensure that small-time lawyers live up to them. A refusal to abandon the 
assumption of a homogeneous profession, even in the face of a statistically 
diverse one, will not only be mismatched to the needs of the public and the 
profession, but will also exacerbate stratification and hierarchy in the 
profession. 
These changes worked by the external forces operating on the structure 
and 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Industrial distribution of lawyers (II Community, Business & Personal Services; 1111 
Public Administration; Private Industry). 
Source: Statistics Canada, Census of Canada, Occupation by Industry, decennial publications; 
special tabulations for 1986. 
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 work of the legal profession and its internal re-organisation and economy 
have exerted a strong influence on the governance of the profession and the 
status of legal ethics. As well as important changes in the nature of law and 
legal education, the different kinds of legal practice mean that the effort to 
impose a unitary and uniform system of governance on the legal profession is 
coming under increasing pressure; the different constituencies agitate for very 
different initiatives and regimes of collective supervision. The debates over 
continuing legal accreditation, articling, diversity, and malpractice insurance 
pit one part of the profession squarely against another. At its most extreme, 
this unrest and division of interests will likely precipitate moves to remove 
or, at least, curtail the legal profession's monopoly. As for legal ethics, the 
consequences of these external and internal pressures are affecting both the 
establishment of shared common norms and their enforcement. There are a 
series of small sub-cultures that have developed and standardised their own 
standards and expectations for ethical behaviour: small-town family lawyers 
operate in a different milieu to the metropolitan corporate deal-makers. In 
this kind of professional climate, it is even more difficult to sustain the idea 
that there are a common set of rules and expectations that can both educate 
and discipline the legal profession in matters of ethical practice. 
 
Roles and rules 
Traditional views and understandings about what it means to be an ethical 
lawyer are based upon narrow and unrealistic assumptions about what ethical 
decisions address and involve, who lawyers are and what they do, what 
constitutes law, and the professional contexts in which these arise. To be a 
legal professional is to enter into a community that has developed a shared set 
of normative practices and expectations that it is authorised or prepared to 
enforce in the face of recalcitrant behaviour. While several devices are used 
to curb and monitor lawyers' behaviour, codes of professional conduct lie at the 
heart of the profession's focus on legal ethics and responsibility. The reasons 
for having codes of professional conduct are fairly obvious-to educate lawyers 
on communal expectations; to affect behaviour; and to offer a basis for 
discipline. However, law societies have tended to develop and adapt their 
professional rules in response to problems that arise: it has been a reactive and 
unambitious approach that lacks any underlying direction or purpose. Some 
critics have insisted that such codes are little more than ethical window-
dressing; they serve to legitimate what lawyers do and impose control over 
economic competition. What passes for talk of ethical standards is, at best, a 
stylised form of professional regulation and, at worst, a self-serving paean to 
professional prestige. 8 In short, professional bodies are, through their codes 
and rules, often as interested in enforcing collegial conformity as fostering a 
sense of ethical purpose; there is a lingering suspicion that the rules do more 
to promote professional self-interest and little to affect ethical behaviour or 
debate among practising lawyers. 
To read any of the provincial codes of professional conduct is to 
encounter a series of pronouncements that are long on righteous aspiration 
and vague generalities, but short on serious instruction and concrete guidance. 
It is a case of not seeing the ethical forest for the law-like trees. Although 
lawyers are weighed down with discrete and detailed directives on this or 
that matter, there is little to counsel the floundering or jaded lawyer in 
establishing an overall and professional modus vivendi. Like the formalist 
 lawyering that many claim to embody and extol, ethics is reduced to a 
technical compliance with a set of simple do's and don'ts-more of a shopping 
list than a genuine effort to inculcate a style and substance of legal practice 
that addresses the whole lawyer not merely the occasional legal transaction. It 
is as much about conformity as it is about conscience. Lawyers approach ethics 
in the same way that they approach law-as a set of rules to be mastered and 
manipulated to serve the purpose in hand. Indeed, under the sway of a 
legalistic mentality, the teaching of legal ethics and responsibility is more like 
a course on office management; it is as much about techniques in filing and 
organisation as it is about thinking through dilemmas and difficulties. 
Even assuming that the various codes are treated as representing a serious 
attempt at ethical instruction and control, an exclusive concentration on the 
rules is misplaced. There is little to be gained by providing an elaborate 
and exhaustive annotation of the rules of professional conduct because, 
not only has this been adequately done, but it ignores the very real fact that 
the influence on lawyers' daily routines and rituals is small: the constant 
attention to and re-drafting of the rules is of decreasing marginal utility.9 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the codes have no place in any 
appreciation of legal ethics and their actual improvement; they are an 
important resource in discussion and decision-making, but they are not a 
decisive or determinate play-book that relieves lawyers of the personal 
responsibility to develop an ethical style and substance of legal practice. The 
codes are a site at which ethical debate can be joined and developed. As with 
many catalogues of rights and responsibilities, there will be competing and 
occasionally contradictory imperatives; duties to one's clients might suggest 
a different course of action to those recommended by the lawyers' 
responsibilities as an officer of the court. In some instances, the rules demand 
that lawyers "must" make certain choices and give priority to certain 
actions. However, the rules more often offer no definite resolution and 
simply provide a rudimentary framework within which lawyers can debate 
and develop an ethical practice of law. It is important therefore to remember 
that the rules do not and cannot relieve lawyers of the continuing 
responsibility to exercise their own professional and moral judgement about 
the appropriate course to follow. In many ways, therefore, the interpretation of 
the professional codes and rules resembles other modes of legal 
interpretation. In the same way that the meaning of constitutional or statutory 
law is not fixed or exhausted by their textual renderings, so the requirements 
of professional responsibility and legal ethics are not reducible to the four 
textual corners of the codes. Both require reference to a wide range of 
interpretive aids and sources, including conventions, customs, tradition, 
cultural expectations, institutional norms, and social values. As with teaching 
legal doctrine generally, little is achieved by simply asking students to learn 
rote-like the rules of professional conduct without also providing them with 
some critical framework within which to understand how those particular 
rules came into being, what they are intended to do, etc. It is the same with 
legal ethics. If students are taught only the rules of professional conduct, they 
will be ill-prepared to adapt those sweeping injunctions to changing 
circumstances or to respond to uncertainty in the rules' meaning or 
application. As so much contemporary jurisprudence insists, it is never 
possible simply to "follow the rules" as the question of what "the rules" mean 
and what it means to "follow" them are never beyond dispute. 10 Legal 
interpretation is an ungrounded practice in that it cannot be engaged in 
 without taking a stand on values or choices that are themselves always 
open to challenge; the distinction between "following the rules" and 
"following one's conscience" is neither as clear nor as uncontroversial as 
traditionalists suggest. Accordingly, the suggestion that a viable and satisfying 
legal ethics can be maintained by adopting the professional role of a rule-
ordered mentality is sorely mistaken. 
As presently practised, legal ethics is more than unthinking compliance 
with the prevailing rules of professional conduct in order to avoid discipline 
or disrepute; it already involves resort to personal conscience in order to 
determine what is a professionally appropriate course of action. 11 Like general 
ethics, legal ethics is contextual in the sense that it involves particular people 
in particular situations making difficult decisions with particular time 
constraints, with imperfect information and with particular consequences for 
particular people. And, of course, there is no context of contexts that allows 
people to fix once and for all their obligations and actions when acting in 
personal or professional roles. There are few right answers that stand outside 
any context or debate. The traditional understandings and expectations are 
after all nothing more (or less) than the accumulated practices of lawyers that 
have been affixed with institutional authority; lawyers can and should 
contribute to as much as respond to the developing culture oflawyering. In this 
way, they are in a better position to cultivate a modus vivendi that enables 
them to bring together the promptings of their personal conscience with the 
demands of their professional occupation. Legal ethics ought to be an active 
meditation on law and lawyering rather than a passive and neutral adherence 
to a professional code. Indeed, the rules are less of a set of directives from 
which lawyers can draw clear guidance, but more a collection of practical 
wisdom with which lawyers can engage and contest. 12 Accordingly, 
compliance with law, in both its spirit and letter, does not amount to 
acceptable ethical behaviour: professional morality is more than law-abiding 
conformity. The fact that most decisions and practices by lawyers allow for a 
variety of manoeuvres or results means that lawyers need to develop a 
professional facility to comprehend and handle such challenges; there is 
rarely an obvious or incontestable path to follow. 
Although it is often forgotten by most lawyers, the study of legal ethics 
is a branch of ethics generally; it is not a subject unto itself. At its broadest, 
ethics involves a meditation on what is wrong and right and, most 
importantly, how such standards are arrived at and validated. Traditionally, 
the task was to elaborate and justify a set of ethical norms that provide an 
authoritative code that people could consult and follow in resolving difficult 
dilemmas. However, faith in the possibility of sketching such a body of 
enduring and universally valid rules has been waning. There is now the less 
absolutist and more sceptical acceptance that ethics is a much more situational 
practice that cannot claim objective or neutral justification. As with general 
ethics, the prevailing standards of right and wrong do not exhaust ethical 
inquiry into legal professionals' behaviour; those standards must themselves be 
subject to scrutiny and challenge. The different ethical theories seek to 
examine critically conventional moral judgements and practices; they offer 
methods and devices through which to justify or condemn particular moral 
answers to controversies or dilemmas. There are almost as many ethical 
theories as there are ethical philosophers. Inmany instances, all ethical theories 
will converge on a similar set of generally accepted norms and standards of 
moral conduct. However, many moral theorists contend that a moral approach 
 to life consists of more than a hell-or-highwater allegiance to one overarching 
code of moral rules and principles; there will be a pragmatic willingness to 
resist hard-and-fast solutions that are supposed to work in all situations. 
None of this should be taken to mean that ethical behaviour and decision-
making is condemned to be irrational or arbitrary, only that what counts and 
operates as reason is never outside of its informing context. In this way, legal 
ethics can be viewed less as a fixed and independent code of professional 
conduct and more as continuing practice within which lawyers construct 
acceptable norms of behaviour as they struggle to comply with them. To be 
an ethical lawyer involves more than learning and applying a set of rules; it 
also demands the cultivation of a critical reflection upon the professional role 
and responsibilities of lawyers. In short, a fully ethical practice requires an 
independent sense of moral virtue that involves the life-long development of 
personal moral character. Because there is no one answer to ethical dilemmas, 
it does not mean that reasoning can be abandoned or that "anything goes". 
In ethical debate, a wide range of answers to arguments can be 
supported by sophisticated chains of reasoning: moral reasoning is not, 
therefore, something that stands outside or in judgement on moral decision-
making, it is made and re-made in the situational process of moral 
engagement and debate. As such, what counts as a good moral reason is a 
matter of justification and persuasion, not proof and authority. Accordingly, I 
do not offer a recommendation that is relativistic (or nihilistic) in which each 
person's conception of right and wrong is as good as or as valid as anyone 
else's. While values are constructed with particular social and historical 
contexts, standards do develop about what is and is not acceptable behaviour, 
even though those standards are never themselves outside of debate and 
transformation. My approach does have the merit of demanding that, if ethical 
issues are to be taken seriously, there must be an acceptance that debate and 
reflection on moral issues is a useful and worthwhile pursuit and that the 
upshot of such engagement might have an effect upon or make a difference 
to a person's decisions and actions. Most importantly, it suggests that acting 
ethically is not about adherence to a code that is resorted to in occasional 
moments of indecision, but is about the development of a moral way of living 
and lawyering that encompasses an organic set of attitudes, dispositions and 
values and that can be incorporated into each lawyer's daily routines and 
regimen. It is to such a recommendation and its practical implications that I 
now tum. 
 
Personal and professional 
From a sceptical perspective, therefore, legal ethics is not about perfecting 
universalisable and enduring codes of conduct. It is about developing a 
transformative and pluralistic practice that respects the contingent and the 
particular and allows for diverse answers and appreciations. The traditional 
concepts and practices of honesty, confidentiality, trust, etc. remain most 
pertinent, but they are given meaning and bite as the context varies; they are 
fundamental, but not absolute values in the legal ethics vocabulary. As Lon 
Fuller pointed out, there is a vast difference between a professional duty that is 
based on "duty" as opposed to "aspiratiori.13 Whereas the former focuses on 
compliance with a set of rules and concentrates on what is not to be done 
rather than what ought to be done, the latter speaks in more positive terms 
and asks professionals to develop a style of practice that inspires ethical 
 conduct rather than merely avoids unethical acts. The traditional emphasis on 
code-based morality breeds a mentality that is more concerned with delineating 
how far a lawyer can go without engaging in unethical conduct: it tends to 
privilege social conformity over efforts to build moral character. It is important 
therefore that lawyers do not internalise the view that it is ethical to do 
whatever is not prohibited by the professional rules; this is an impoverished 
and thin view of professional responsibility and legal ethics. 
In contrast to understanding the demands of legal ethics as being 
satisfied by the memorisation of appropriate institutionalised responses to 
particular factsituations, it ought to be about developing a framework within 
which to understand and reflect about the inevitable ethical dilemmas that 
acting as a professional throws up. As such, legal ethics should be a vibrant 
and dynamic way of being a lawyer that is not something that lawyers 
simply refer to in stereotypical situations, but is an integral dimension of 
what it means to be a good lawyer that pervades and infiltrates professionals' 
whole way of thinking about and acting as lawyers. In developing such a 
notion and practice of professional ethics, the challenge is neither to 
abandon a sense of personal morality and defer all ethical responsibility to 
the unique role and status of the legal professional nor to adhere entirely to the 
dictates of one's personal conscience and ignore the special responsibilities 
that attach to being a professional. It is a matter of creating a balance between 
the two such that it is possible to bring together the professional and the 
personal in a legal ethics that satisfies the pushes of personal morality and 
the pulls of professional conduct. To do otherwise is either to relinquish 
personal responsibility entirely to the self-interested norms of official codes 
of professional conduct or to ignore entirely the genuine framework of 
professional responsibilities that must influence and affect the dictates of 
personal conscience. It most definiteJy is not a choice between law and 
morality, such that the true professional must abandon all efforts to be a 
good person in being a good lawyer. 
Instead of positing professional ethics and personal morality as being 
entirely separate and, at times, being in direct conflict, it is much more useful 
and desirable to view one's ethical responsibility as a professional to be part 
of one's personal morality as an individual. Having developed a personal 
sense of moral integrity, lawyers should not be faced with the possibility that 
it will be jeopardised rather than reinforced by the need to subordinate 
personal values to professional goals.14 To ask lawyers to forgo moral 
judgement is to reduce them to amoral technicians with significant 
drawbacks and limitations-the practice and defence of a role-differentiation 
is only sustainable if there is widespread support for and confidence in the 
institutional processes of law, and this is surely suspect. Ignoring moral 
considerations, lawyers will begin to be more competitive and less co-
operative, more opportunistic and less principled, and more self-
regarding and less committed. Moreover, on the basis that lawyers tend to 
identify more than most with their jobs, the amorality of their professional 
role will begin to infect their personal lives-the amorality will become its 
own impoverished morality by default: "lawyers' sensitivities can atrophy 
or narrow to fit the constricted universe dictated by role". 15 Strict 
adherence to a strong role-differentiation asks lawyers to engage in a form of 
moral schizophrenia. This has considerable costs to lawyers-their sense of 
moral judgement atrophies; they lose track of what is and is not important; and 
their clients are reduced to nothing more than fee-generating opportunities. 16 
 Accordingly, while legal ethics does not simply collapse into personal 
morality, there has to be a recognition that "role-differentiated behaviour" has 
a legitimate claim on the attention of those who strive to be ethical lawyers. 
Although lawyers must assume personal responsibility for their professional 
activities, it does not mean that they must only do as a lawyer what they 
would do as an individual (which, in many cases, might tum out to be very 
extensive). It simply asks them to answer to themselves about the extent of 
dissonance that a professional-differentiated role should allow. Mindful of the 
social and political realities in which they offer their professional services, 
lawyers must confront the consequences of their choices about who to 
represent, the methods of representation and the broader consequences of 
their work. If lawyers did permit their own values and preferences to 
infiltrate all their work, it would mean that lawyers were abusing their 
privileges by rationing a valuable public service only to those whose views 
happen to coincide with their own. However, this does not mandate a 
wholesale abrogation of moral responsibility by lawyers. Instead, it suggests 
that lawyers should try to better integrate their professional and personal 
lives. Re-working the balance between role-morality and personal conscience, 
a fresh account of legal ethics would place the individual at the centre of the 
process and encourage lawyers to develop a critical morality that encompasses 
such pressing issues as "what kind of lawyer do I want to be?" and "what 
interests am I going to spend my life serving as a lawyer?" 17 
By asking lawyers to cabin their moral judgement, such advice endangers 
the whole moral standing of the legal profession. In the traditional approach, 
there is very little space for reflection or engagement; reference to the rules 
is intended to provide definitive and authoritative answers. My approach 
suggests that legal ethics has more to do with a practice of situated 
reasoning and has more to do with the interests, purposes and consequences 
of the participants and their contexts. Reliance on codes atrophies the moral 
intelligence and leaves lawyers adrift without a moral compass when those 
professional rules run out or give conflicting advice: my approach encourages 
continual reflection and therefore better prepares the lawyer for difficult 
situations. Indeed, in a manner of speaking, lawyers are in better shape to 
avoid and resolve ethical dilemmas because their daily regimen requires them 
to challenge and analyse critically most situations and settings. 
The other choice for the enlightened lawyer is to abandon the notion of 
a professionally differentiated role morality entirely and incorporate all their 
personal values into the professional arena. This seems an unwise and 
undesirable move as lawyers will be abandoning their public trust and 
abusing their monopolistic privileges. The challenge is to integrate the 
demands of a professional role with the dictates of a personal morality and 
be able to construct important bridges between the two so that they can each 
support and fructify each other: one feeds off the other. To provide sound 
professional judgement, it is necessary to resort to a well-honed and mature 
sense of moral acuity. Unless one subscribes to a very formalistic account 
oflaw, a familiarity with and sensitivity to moral issues is an essential quality 
that all lawyers must have if they are to advise clients about any particular 
area of law or what the courts are likely to do in any particular case. Without 
such resources, lawyers will be ill-equipped to fulfill the most basic skills of 
legal representation; they become only technicians, not advisers. To flinch this 
challenge or to settle it by default is to fail as both a matter of professional 
and personal responsibility; it will impoverish both professional and personal 
 pursuits. 
Also, the traditional approach fails to involve the client sufficiently in the 
provision of legal services and the fulfilment of client satisfaction. Based on 
an assumption that has no empirical or theoretical merit, they are seen to 
have fixed interests and stand outside the moral domain of the lawyer. The 
reality is that clients rely as much on lawyers to define their interests as they 
do to protect them. In my approach, the client is treated as a conversational 
partner who can contribute and be persuaded about particular courses of 
action and their likely consequences. Indeed, client selection is one of the 
most important and most neglected issues for lawyers because, once a client 
is taken on, the lawyer does have some responsibility to treat that person 
differently than other persons; they are engaged in a special relationship that 
lawyers cannot simply abandon as and when they choose. Notwithstanding 
rhetoric to the contrary, lawyers can choose whatever clients they wish. In 
Canada, there is no equivalent to the English cab-rank rule which requires 
barristers to accept any client at a reasonable fee in their area of expertise. 
Consequently, lawyers must take responsibility about and for the clients that 
they choose to represent. 
 
Practical implications 
The requirement for ethical behaviour and moral character flows from the idea 
that law is a profession and one in which its members are trustees for the 
public good in the administration of justice. Dating back to Rome's 
Theodesian Code and Anglo-Saxon England, lawyers have always been 
required to take an oath that they will fulfil their professional responsibilities 
in a good and virtuous manner. This is still the case today. New lawyers have 
to be certified as being of good character and to swear an oath upon 
admission that they will uphold the highest standards of moral integrity. 
However, there is very little consensus on what the requirement of moral 
character entails or demands. Apart from abstaining from criminal or illegal 
activities (or, at least, not getting caught), law societies treat such inquiries in a 
pro Jonna way; there is only the most perfunctory inquiry into a person's 
moral character that is largely confined to the applicant's own admission 
and answers. Applicants are presumed to be of good character and, therefore, 
suitable for legal practice unless there is evidence to the contrary. If the 
requirement of moral character is to be maintained, then law societies must 
begin to take more seriously its testing and certification. Importantly, the 
acquisition of legal competence ought not to be treated as equivalent to the 
establishment of moral character: they are very different and mutually 
exclusive attainments. 
A central problem is that, as one critic astutely observes, the inquiry into 
moral character is both too early and too late in the overall professional 
process. 18 Occurring on entry into the Bar admission courses, it arises before 
applicants have experienced any genuine ethical dilemmas under real-world 
pressures; they have no practical context in which to put to the test their 
ethical intuitions and commitment (or lack of it). However, such institutional 
assessments occur only after a considerable investment of time and money in 
academic education by fledging lawyers. Like other skills and requirements, the 
testing and tutoring of a refined ethical sensibility should be part of a life-
long learning process: there needs to be substantial peer review and a regular 
auditing process which would both challenge and train lawyers about the 
 worth and importance of ethical lawyering. Nevertheless, the question of 
whether law schools should police the moral character of their students is hotly 
debated and contested-are law schools primarily academic institutions or 
gatekeepers for the profession? 
Legal ethics is a life-long challenge in which lawyers must be encouraged 
to go beyond simply learning the rules and how to apply them; they should 
constantly interrogate themselves and their colleagues about the moral status 
of their work and practices. Accordingly, lawyers must be helped to hone 
and question a sense of moral judgement about themselves and their work. 
While many lawyers lead ethical lives and carry much of that over into their 
professional lives, there is still a depressing indifference to issues of legal 
ethics and a lamentable ignorance about how to identify and deal with 
situations that raise ethical queries and challenges. The first task, therefore, 
is for people to enhance and interrogate their own sense of moral judgement 
and responsibility; this is too often assumed to be in place. Mindful that 
ethical training is primarily concerned with learning about oneself, students 
need to confront ethical dilemmas in concrete circumstances in order to 
begin to discover (or construct), question and articulate their own moral 
views before they struggle with the complex demands of a professional ethic. 
There is an urgent need to stimulate the moral imagination and cultivate each 
person's sense of moral responsibility, such that they are able to develop a 
moral facility that is capable of recognising ethical dilemmas, analysing 
them, and responding to them in a responsible and realistic way. A pervasive 
difficulty in achieving this is that legal ethics is more about responsibilities 
than rights and, therefore, does not sit easily or well with much of the legal 
education that lawyers receive. 
Insofar as the practice of legal ethics is in disarray, the law societies and 
the law schools must shoulder a considerable share of the blame for failing 
to provide an institutional setting for establishing a sophisticated 
understanding of professional responsibility and its demands. Few law schools 
take very seriously the need to offer training of a mandatory or optional kind 
to its graduates. Certainly, the extent and sophistication of courses in legal 
ethics comes nowhere close to mirroring those of the substantive courses. 
Furthermore, the courses that do exist tend to treat the teaching of legal 
ethics as if it were simply one more course, with the same intellectual 
ambitions and pedagogical techniques as business association or torts. In an 
important sense, although law schools have not taken the teaching of legal 
ethics seriously, they have still instilled within students and lawyers a 
certain sense of professional ethics. Indeed, law schools cannot avoid 
teaching legal ethics as "the very act of teaching ... creates images of law and 
lawyering when we teach doctrine through cases and hypotheticals". 19 
Unfortunately, reinforced by the general rule-centred attitude to the study of 
legal doctrine, law students settle neatly into thinking of legal ethics as 
involving a similar process of role-detachment and legalistic application. 
To their credit, however, the law societies and law schools have begun to 
take their own responsibility in meeting this shortcoming much more 
seriously. Stirred into action by some first-rate studies and reform proposals, 
20 there is now a compulsory component in most provincial Bar admission 
courses. Nevertheless, there is still a considerable way to go as instruction 
remains closely tied to the rote-learning of the codes and the tendency to 
treat legal ethics the same as other subjects remains pronounced. All in all, 
therefore, the efforts to prepare young lawyers for the ethical rigours of legal 
 practice are still very limited and more an afterthought than a core feature of 
the curriculum. It will take a sea-change in both the scope and substance of 
courses taught and the style and pedagogy through which they are presented. 
As well as altering their attitudes and approach to the teaching of legal 
ethics, law societies must encourage their members to adopt a much more 
expansive understanding of their ethical responsibilities. It can do this in a 
number of ways. At an institutional level, lawyers can be constantly reminded 
that they must not neglect or overlook the opportunity to converse with other 
lawyers. This can be done by proliferating the forums-in law schools, in 
professional gatherings, in law firms, etc.-within which dialogue and 
engagement can be nurtured and thrive. In this way, lawyers might explore 
their own moral intuitions in the testing context of others' views without 
risking public criticism or risk. Also, it can be made clear to lawyers that 
their moral obligations as professionals extend beyond concern with their own 
individual actions and should encompass a responsibility to monitor the 
actions of other lawyers. In this way, professional responsibility is as much a 
collective as well as personal undertaking in which each lawyer should 
contribute to the moral health of the profession as a whole. 
 
Conclusion 
As with so much else, de Tocqueville was not only half right about his 
assessment of (American) lawyers when he wrote, but his conclusions remain 
equally valid and invalid today. He was surely accurate in his pronouncement 
that lawyers constituted the new aristocracy of society. However, he was well 
wide of the mark in believing that such an elite status was warranted because 
the legal profession functioned as the enlightened and sensible guardians of 
the public good.21 Although traditional versions of legal ethics are still 
defended in the name of public service, there are few lawyers who conduct 
their daily professional lives in such a spirit. It is unrealistic to imagine or 
expect that every lawyer will, like Socrates, only be guided by the need to do 
right rather than wrong: most lawyers are reasonably concerned about their 
jobs, paying their mortgages, providing for their kids, etc. Indeed, there is 
ample evidence to demonstrate that lawyers will hold to ethical principles when 
it is in their interests to do so or, more accurately, when their financial 
considerations coincide with their ethical ones.22 However, it is neither 
unreasonable nor unrealistic to expect that they can be persuaded, collectively 
and individually, to accept the noble challenge of redeeming the legal 
profession's moral standing and of fashioning a fresh image of legal ethics 
and professional responsibility that serves a fragmented society. 
At the heart of any efforts to reaffirm the profession in its own and the 
public's moral esteem must be the commitment to emphasise that lawyers 
need not and should not spend the bulk of their professional lives doing what 
they would shy away from in their personal lives. Can it really be appropriate 
that lawyers should act in wilful disregard of moral considerations which 
would weigh heavily on them and others in their personal lives? In short, 
lawyers must stop asking whether a good lawyer can be a bad person and 
begin providing answers to how good persons and good lawyers can co-exist 
in the same person. This is a task that all lawyers should relish. Moreover, 
legal ethics should not be thought of as something that arises in discrete and 
exceptional circumstances. Everything that lawyers do, from the selection of 
clients to their involvement in civic affairs, implicates and reflects a lawyer's 
 approaches and understanding of what it means to be an ethical lawyer. A 
lawyer who appreciates the full import of what it demands to be an ethical 
lawyer understands that ethical considerations are at the heart of lawyering, 
not a peripheral concern. To be a good person and a good lawyer need not 
be the oxymoron that Plato and more modern pessimists seem to believe it 
to be. 
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